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PATCHELL V. GROOM REVISITED: DISTRIBUTIONS
AMONG DESCENDANTS PER STIRPES

By FREDERICK J.

SINGLEY, JR.*

In its opinion in the case of Patchell v. Groom,' decided
in 1945, a majority of the Maryland Court unequivocally
adopted the reasoning of a series of English cases dealing
with stirpital distributions. The rule of these cases, and
of Patchell v. Groom, was that the stirpes for purposes of
such distributions were to be found among the first takers
and not among the ancestors or other individuals who took
no absolute estate, even although designated by name.
Patchell v. Groom' aroused interest in Maryland and
elsewhere,' but was not cited by the Court of Appeals for
nearly ten years. In 1954, a substantially similar question
was considered by the Court in Ballenger v. McMillan,4
where a result was reached which was not only at sharp
variance from that in Patchell v. Groom, but narrows the
area within which the Patchell case may be regarded as
controlling authority.
It should be emphasized that these cases were not concerned with a gift to "my descendants equally"; a gift to
"the descendants of A"; or a gift to "my descendants", without a direction or an implication that a stirpital distribution
was intended. In these examples, the rule is that all take
per capita,in the absence of contrary intention. 5
* Of the Baltimore Bar; A.B., 1933, Johns Hopkins University, LL.B.,
1936, University of Maryland.
185 Md. 10, 43 A. 2d 32 (1945).
2Ibid.
8
13 A. L. R. 2d 1023, 1076.
A... Md. .... 106A. 2d 109 (1954).
5
Judik v. Travers, 184 Md. 215, 40 A. 2d 306 (1944) ; Levering v. Orrick,
97 Md. 139, 54 A. 620 (1903) ; Requardt v. Safe Deposit Co., 143 Md. 431,
122 A. 526 (1923).
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Nor were these cases concerned with an immediate gift
to "my descendants, per stirpes and not per capita";or with
a gift to "A and his descendants per stirpes". These are the
classical examples of distributions per stirpes, when the
heir cannot share with a living ancestor.
"It is not conceivable how any property can be
divided among persons and their issue per stirpes....
A stirps is a root of inheritance; it designates the ancestor from whom the heir derives title; and it necessarily presupposes the death of the ancestor. When
issue are said to take per stirpes, it is meant that the
descendants of a deceased person take the property to
which he was entitled, or would have been entitled if
living."
Both Patchell v. Groom and Ballenger v. McMillan dealt
with situations where the individuals who might otherwise
have been the stirpes were not the first takers. In Patchell,
the Grindall will provided:
"At the death of the last survivor of my children...
I do hereby devise and direct that all my estate . . .
shall be divided equally among all of my descendants
then living per stirpes and not per capita,..
In the Ballenger case, the Gorman deed of trust
provided:
" 'the trust is to continue during the lives of all the
children of the said William H. Gorman, and upon
the death of the last surviving child of the said William
H. Gorman the trust shall terminate and the principal
of the trust estate shall go to all the descendants of
divided among
William H. Gorman then living, to be
8
them per stirpes and not per capita'."
These are the narrow limits of the problem which has
been troubling the Courts here and in England for nearly a
century: If a gift is made by A to "my children B, C and D
for life, and on the death of the survivor of them to my
6 Rotmanskey v. Heiss, 86 Md. 633, 634, 39 A. 415 (1898).
"Supra,
n. 1, 13.
8
Supra, n. 4, 110.
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descendants, per stirpes", are the stirpes or stocks to be
found among A's children, B, C and D or among the children
of B, C and D? Patchell held that the children of B, C and
D were the stocks; Ballenger, that B, C and D were themselves the stirpes for purposes of distribution.
A further problem exists with respect to limitations in
favor of the descendants of persons other than the testator
or settlor. Assume that A makes a gift to "the descendants
of my brothers X and Y, per stirpes". Do the brothers constitute the stirpes, or are the stocks to be found in their
children? The Patchell case takes the latter view, and may
still remain authority for this proposition.
The problem of these cases was apparently first considered by the House of Lords in 1863 in the case of Robinson v. Shepherd.' In that case, the testator died in 1862,
leaving his estate:
"'to the persons, being such descendants as next hereinafter mentioned, in equal shares, among and to the
lawful descendants living at the time of his (the testator's) death, of such of the brothers and sisters of his
late grandfather, Henry Pearson, deceased, as had died
leaving lawful descendants, such descendants, respectively, to be entitled to share the same moneys in a
course of distribution per stirpes and not per capita'."'"
Two of the sisters of testator's grandfather had died
leaving descendants. Sir John Romilly, then Master of the
Rolls, held that the estate was initially divisible into two
shares, one for the descendants of each sister, who would
then share per capita:
"How can I give the fund 'per stirpes and not per
capita', and at the same time give it 'in equal shares'.
I am of opinion.., that there are two roots, that the
fund must be divided into two parts, and then that one
of them must be divided equally amongst the descendants of one daughter, and the other moiety amongst
those of the other daughter, living at the death of the
testator. If one left eleven and the other five descend932 Beavan 665, 55 Eng. Rep. 261 (1863), rev'd., 4 De 0. J. & S. 129,
46 Eng. Rep. 865 (1863).
lo Ibid.
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ants, it would have to be divided into two equal shares,
and one such share would then be divided in elevenths
and the other in fifths.""
Lord Westbury, then the Lord Chancellor, reversed the
Master of the Rolls, holding12 that per stirpes referred to
the descendants of brothers and sisters, and not to the
brothers and sisters themselves. Lord Westbury concluded
that:
".. . descendants . . . are to be classified secundum
stirpes or according to their families, and that the
property in question is to be divided into as many
shares as there are stirpes or families, each stirps or
family taking an equal share."
In 1866, the problem was again presented to the English
Courts in Gibson v. Fisher.2 In this case, the will provided:
"'And pay all the rest, residue, and remainder of
the moneys equally amongst the descendants of the
brothers and sisters of the whole and half blood of my
late father, John Fisher,who may be living at the time
of my decease; such descendants of the brothers and
sisters of my father to take severally as tenants in
common, per stirpes and not per capita'."
The testator's father had 4 brothers and sisters, all of
whom were dead, leaving 9 children who survived the
testator. The Master of the Rolls who had decided Robinson
v. Shepherd, now Lord Romilly, concluded that the fund
was initially divisible into four and not into nine parts.
He regarded the case as res integra and declined to follow
Robinson v. Shepherd, which he felt was contrary to established authority:
"I am of opinion it must be ascertained how many
brothers and sisters of the whole and half blood of
the testator's father, John Fisher, had descendants
who were living at the time of the testator's decease,
and that the whole fund must be divided into as many
portions as there were families descended from such
brothers and sisters then living.""
Ibid, 262.
"Ibid, 133, 867.
IL.
R. 5 Eq. 51, 37 L. J. (N. S.) 67 (1867).
I Ibid, 58.
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Lord Westbury, who had reversed Lord Romilly in
Robinson v. Shepherd had resigned in 1865, and Romilly
apparently held some hope that Robinson v. Shepherd
might yet be overruled if an appeal were taken in Gibson
v. Fisher. Quoting again from Romilly's opinion in Gibson
v. Fisher:
"I have looked very carefully at the Lord Chancellor's decree in Robinson v. Shepherd. Probably
neither the Lord Chancellor nor I ever saw the decrees
after they were drawn up and before they were passed
and entered; but it is very difficult to say that either
of them can be right as they stand. The result has been
that, on the whole, I have thought, considering that
there may be an appeal from my decision by which the
whole matter may be reviewed before a Court of competent jurisdiction, that it would be better that I regard
the case as if it were res integra without any previous
decision in the case of Robinson v. Shepherd, . ..."
No appeal was taken from Lord Romilly's decree in
Gibson v. Fisher and it was not until 1883 that the question arose again, in the Chancery Division in In Re Wilson. 6
Thomas Wilson had died in 1848, and had left his estate to
Trustees to pay the income to his wife for life; then to his
children; and in default of children to his cousins, the
children living at the termination of the trust of four aunts
and two uncles:
to the stocks, and not to the number of
"... according
' 17
individuals."
At the death of the widow, without leaving children, there
were surviving one cousin and the children and descendants of 15 deceased cousins. The question presented was
whether the fund was initially divisible into six parts
(uncles and aunts) or 16 parts (cousins). The Court (North,
J.), said:
"The question is, where am I to look for 'the
stocks'?"'"
Is Ibid.
"In Re Wilson (Parker v. Winder), 24 Ch. D. 664, 53 L. J. Ch. (N. S.)
130 (1883).
17Ibid, 665.
Ibid, 667.
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Quoting Robinson v. Shepherd:
"... the words 'per stirpes' refer to the descendants."' 9

Then the Court distinguished Gibson v. Fisher and said:
"If, however, those two cases were authorities exactly applicable to the present case, and I had to choose
between them, I would follow Robinson v. Shepherd in
2
preference to Gibson v. Fisher."

In 1911, the same question came before the Chancery
Division in In Re Dering." The Court (Warrington, J.),
preferred Robinson v. Shepherd and In Re Wilson to Gibson
v. Fisher, and found that the provision,
"In trust for such of the issue of my deceased aunts,
Charlotte Elizabeth Haslewood and Harriet Mary
Majendie who shall be living at my decease, such issue
to take per stirpes and not per capita."'2

required an initial division into 13 shares, one for each of
the children of the aunts and not into two shares represented by the aunts themselves.
Finally, in 1918, the case of In Re Alexander,3 was decided by the Chancery Division.
Here, Alexander had died in 1887, leaving £20,000 in
trust, income to his three sisters and the survivor of them,
remainder on the death of the survivor of them,
"... for such of my nephews and nieces" (as may be
living at death of survivor of the sisters) "and for the
issue then living of any such nephews and nieces of
mine who may have previously died ...

as tenants in

equal shares per stirpes."'

The survivor of the three sisters, none of whom had
children, died. Four brothers of the testator had left 14
nephews and nieces surviving at the time of the termination of the trust. In addition, there were descendants of
five deceased nephews and nieces surviving.
"Ibid.
Ibid, 668.
In Re Dering (Neall v. Beale), 105 L. T. 404.
Ibid.
In Re Alexander (Alexander v. Alexander) (1919), 1 Cb. 371.
Ibid, 372.
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The Court determined that the fund should be initially
divided into 19, and not into four parts. Admitting a preference for Gibson v. Fisher,Sargant, J., felt bound by Robinson v. Shepherd, and held that the stirpital division began
with the first class of takers, the nephews and nieces.
In 1927, when the problem was first presented to the
Maryland Court of Appeals in the case of Lycett v.
Thomas,2 5 the Court of Appeals found five English cases:
four holding that the stocks, or stirpes must be found in
the first takers; and only one adhering to the view that the
stirpes are to be found among the named individuals or the
designated class without reference to whether or not they
take a beneficial interest absolutely. Moreover, in 1913,
New York had adopted the view of the English,cases in In
Re Title Guaranteeand Trust Co.26 Elsewhere in the United
2
States, the authorities were in sharp conflict. ?
In Lycett v. Thomas, the Court of Appeals was called
upon to construe a deed executed by Isaac M. Cate, by
which property had been conveyed to a Trustee. Income
from the fund was to be divided into five equal parts. One
part was to be paid to each of three daughters; one part to
a son; and one part to the children of a deceased daughter.
There was a provision that if the son died without descendants, his share of the income was to be divided,
"among his nephews and nieces then living and the descendants then living
of any deceased nephews or
'28
nieces, per stirpes.
The question presented was whether the son's share of
income was to be initially divided into four parts (i.e.,
among the stocks represented by his sisters) or whether it
was to be equally divided among nephews and nieces. The
Court took the latter view, and in an opinion by Judge
Adkins, held that:
- 153 Md. 443, 138 A. 225 (1927), cited in 78 A. L. R. 1385, 1387.
159 App. Div. 803, 144 N. Y. S. 889 (1913), affirmed without opinion, 212
N. Y. S. 551, 106 N. E. 1043 (1914).
71 The cases are collected and analysed in a series of notes: 16 A. L. R. 15,
150, 31 A. L. R. 799, and, after Lycett v. Thomas, 78 A. L. R. 1385, 126
A. L. R. 157, 13 A. L. R. 2d 1023.
2 Supra, n. 25, 445.
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"The words 'per stirpes' are naturally applied to
descendants, and mean according to stock or by representation....
"'When issue are said to take per stirpes,it is meant
that the descendants of a deceased person take the
property to which he was entitled, or would have been
entitled if living'."2 9
While the English cases were cited in the opinion in
Lycett v. Thomas, the Court did not appear to have felt
them necessarily controlling, but primarily rested its conclusion on the substitutional character of a stirpital distribution:
"A stirps is a root of inheritance; it designates the
ancestor from whom the heir derives title; and 3it
neces0
sarily presupposes the death of the ancestor.
Eighteen years later, in 1945, however, a majority of
the Maryland Court unequivocally adopted the rule of the
English cases in Patchell v. Groom.3
Particularly noteworthy are two circumstances: first,
that the applicability of the principle had not been recognized by counsel for any of the parties, but was apparently
invoked by the Court; and second, that the application of
the rule was not necessary to the result of the case, since
the fractional shares remained unchanged whether or not
the first takers constituted true stocks.
The Patchell case dealt with the Will of John T.
Grindall, who died in 1885, survived by five children. A
portion of his estate was left in trust and the trust terminated on July 25, 1943, on the death of his surviving child.
The will provided:
"'At the death of the last survivor of my children... it is my will that the trust hereinbefore mentioned shall cease and determine, and thereupon I do
hereby devise and direct that all my estate and property real, personal and mixed shall be divided equally
-Ibid, 448.
" MILB, CONSTRUcMON OF WILLS (1927), Sec. 97, quoting Judge Bryan's
opinion in Rotmanskey v. Heiss, supra, n. 6.
185 Md. 10, 43 A. 2d 32 (1945), cited in 13 A. L. R. 2d 1023, 1076.
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among all of my descendants then living per stirpes
and not per capita, to them, their heirs, personal representatives and assigns absolutely'." 2
Upon the death of the last survivor of the children, there
were four grandchildren surviving; two were the children
of the testator's son Albert; two, the children of his daughter, Mary Eliza.
The question presented to the Court on appeal was the
proper construction of the phrase,
".. . divided equally among all of my descendants
then living per stirpes and not per capita.""3
The appellants, the guardians ad litem of the greatgrandchildren of the testator, had contended that while
distribution was per stirpes to the point of dividing the
estate between the two branches represented by the two
children of the testator who had left children surviving,
beyond this point distribution was to be made per capita,
with grandchildren in each branch sharing equally with
more remote descendants.
Judge Marbury, speaking for a majority of the Court,
consisting of Judges Delaplaine, Grason and Melvin, cited
the familiar rule:
"Where bequests are made to descendants equally,
or to all the descendants of any person, or to the descendants simply, the rule is that all take per capita,
unless a contrary intention appears."' '
and found the expression of contrary intention in the use
of the phrase "per stirpes and not per capita".
The opinion then referred to the substitutional concept
of stirpital distribution adopted in Rotmanskey v. Heiss and
then reviewed the line of English cases in detail. Continuing its opinion, the Court said:
"But in a case where, not by accident but by design,
the first takers are not the children, but the grandchildren, it follows, just as clearly, that the grandIbid, 13.
Ibid.
81Ibid, 14.
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children must be the stocks, and not their parents who
do not take at all. That is the theory of the English
decisions which have been approved by this Court....
"The doctrine of these cases is that a descendant
cannot take by substitution the share of a deceased
ancestor unless that ancestor would have taken that
share had he been living at the appointed time. If the
ancestor is not entitled to take by the provisions of the
will, then he has no share which his descendant can
take, and if his descendant is the first person entitled
to take, then that descendant does not take by substitution, but is the primary taker in his own right."3 5
Then the Court pointed out that under the facts of the
Patchell case, the decision did not affect the result:
"In the instant case it happens to make no practical difference whether we determine that the children
are the stocks or whether we determine that the grandchildren are the stirpes. That is so because there were
two children leaving descendants and each of these
two children had two children. But we think the question should be clarified."3 6
It seems clear that this is the rationale of the Patchell
case, and having had the attention of the judicial mind,
cannot be minimized as obiter dicta. 7
There was a spirited minority opinion3" filed by Judge
Henderson, in which Judges Collins and Markell joined.
Their disagreement with the view taken by the majority
was based on Section 303 of the Restatement of Property,
which adopts the rule that a distribution to the descendants
of a designated individual follows the statutory distribution
in intestacy, in the absence of an expression of contrary
intent. The English cases were distinguished.
"Lycett v. Thomas, supra, and the English cases
therein cited, belong to a narrow class of gifts to 'the
Ibid, 23.
Ibid, 23-24. Emphasis supplied.
8 Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471 (1854); U. Rwys. & E. Co. v.
M. & C. C. of Balto., 121 Md. 552, 88 A. 617 (1913); McGraw v. Merryman,
133 Md. 247, 104 A. 540 (1918).
Supra, n. 31, sep. op. 26.
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descendants of A and B, per stirpes', i.e., independent
gifts to the descendants of any one of two or more
persons, unconnected with previous gifts of income to
the same descendants or the specified ancestors. In
such cases, the question arises as to the intended point
of reference, a question that cannot arise where the
testator speaks of his own descendants, who necessarily begin with his children."8 9
When Patchell v. Groom was decided in 1945, the Court
of Appeals did not have before it the opinion in Sidey v.
Perpetual Trustees Estate and Agency Co. of New Zealand, 0 decided by the Privy Council. The Sidey will
provided:
"And from and after the death of the last survivor
of my said four children as aforesaid I give devise
and bequeath the whole of my residuary estate real
and personal to and amongst my then surviving descendants in such manner that the same shall be
divisible per stirpes among the children grandchildren
and remoter issue of such of my children as shall have
left issue."'"
Upon the death of the last surviving of the testator's
children, there were nine grandchildren living, the descendants of three children. If the grandchildren were the
stocks, the estate would be initially divided into nine
shares; if the children, into three shares.
In the lower Court, the grandchildren were held to be
the stocks. On appeal to the Privy Council, this was reversed. Lord Simonds, the Lord Chancellor, said in his
opinion:
"They (their Lordships) cannot accept the suggestion made in the argument of this appeal that there is
any rule of construction which requires a stirpital
division to begin at one generation rather than another.
In every case the result must depend upon the language
that is used and the context in which it is used."4 2
Ibid, 31.
(1944) 2 All E. R. 225, (1944) A. C. 194.
-Ibid, 226.
Ibid, 227.
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There followed a discussion of the testator's intent as
found in the Sidey will, and a review of the English cases.
Finally, Lord Simonds concluded:
"Their Lordships do not think it necessary to question the correctness of any of the decisions to which
reference has been made, but they cannot elevate the
reasoning which led to such decisions into a rule of
construction. There appears to them on principle to
be no reason why in the construction of a gift per
stirpes the stocks should be found among the takers
and not among their ancestors."4
In mid-1954, Ballenger v. McMillan,"' came before the
Court of Appeals of Maryland. The 1945 Court which had
decided Patchell v. Groom had consisted of seven judges;
the 1954 Court, of five. Of those who had joined in the
majority opinion, only Judge Delaplaine remained. Judge
Henderson, who had written the minority opinion, was
still a member of the Court, as was Judge Collins who had
been a member of the minority.
Moreover, the publication of the English Reports, delayed by World War II, had been resumed, and Lord
Simonds' opinion in the Sidey case was readily available.
Ballenger v. McMillan involved the construction of a
deed of trust executed in 1912 by William H. Gorman. The
pertinent provision of the deed was as follows:
" '... the trust is to continue during the lives of all
the children of the said William H. Gorman, and upon
the death of the last surviving child of the said William
H. Gorman the trust shall terminate and the principal
of the trust estate shall go to all the descendants of the
said William H. Gorman then living, to be divided
among them per stirpes and not per capita.' ...""
William H. Gorman had four children: Douglas, who
had five children; Elizabeth, who had four children; Albert,
who had three children; and Nora, who had two children.
Thus, on the death of the last survivor of William's children, the question was presented, did the children con,Ibid, 228.

...Md-. ...,106 A. 2d 109 (1954).
,Ibid, 110.
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stitute the stocks for an initial division of the trust estate
into four parts, or did the grandchildren constitute the
stocks, for an initial division of the trust estate into fourteen parts.
The lower Court followed the rule of Patchell v. Groom
and of the English cases holding that the stocks were to
be found in the grandchildren and that the trust was
initially divisible into fourteen parts. On appeal, this was
unanimously reversed by the Court of Appeals, which filed
an opinion written by Judge Collins.
The Court again reviewed the English cases, and pointed
out that Patchell v. Groom had been decided at a time
when the opinion of Sidey v. PerpetualTrustees Estate and
Agency Co. of New Zealand46 was not before it. As an additional reason for declining to follow the holding in the
Patchell case, the Court placed reliance on the absence of
the word "equally" from the dispositive provisions of the
Gorman deed of trust.
There follows in the opinion a long quotation from the
minority opinion of Judge Henderson in the Patchell case,
in which reliance was placed on Section 303 of the Restatement of Property, which provides in part as follows:
"(1) When a conveyance creates a class gift by a
limitation in favor of a group described as the 'issue
of B', or as the 'descendants of B', and the membership
in such class has been ascertained in accordance with
the rules stated in Secs. 292 and 294-299, then, unless
a contrary intent of the conveyor is found from additional language or circumstances, distribution is made
to such members of the class as would take, and in such
shares as they would receive, under the applicable law
of intestate succession if B had died intestate on the
date of the final ascertainment of the membership in
the class, owning the subject matter of the class gift."
Comment f says:
"Operation of the stated rule
Effect of all descendants of one generation being dead. When a limitation is made to the 'issue of B', . . . and all of B's
-

,Supra, n. 40.
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children are dead, but grandchildren of B are alive,
a problem arises as to whether these grandchildren of
B take equal shares or take as representatives of their
respective parents. This is determined in any state in
the same manner as the similar problem of intestate
succession is determined in that same state. Commonly
existent statutes provide that remote issue of the intestate, when all of the same degree, take per capita.
Where such a statute exists, the distribution of a class
gift of the sort described in this Comment would be
regulated thereby unless a 'contrary intention of the
conveyor is found from additional language or circumstances'."
Judge Henderson had also pointed out that the Maryland Statute of Distributions47 and the English Statute of
Distributions, both of which are based on Roman Law, provide for a stirpital distribution among grandchildren, the
children of the intestate constituting the stocks or stirpes.
The rule is to the contrary in most American jurisdictions,
which accounts for the variant in the Restatement, Section 303(f).
It would seem that our Court of Appeals, in Ballenger
v. McMillan,4 8 has turned its back on the artificialities of
the rule followed in Patchell v. Groom,49 Robinson v. Shepherd, 0 and in the English cases, and has adopted the more
realistic view of Sidey v. Perpetual Trustees.51
Two limitations should be stated, however:
(1) Intention may be a controlling factor in any construction case.
"I do not enter into an examination of the cases:
when I see an intention clearly expressed in a will, and
find no rule of law opposed to giving effect to it, I disregard previous cases."5
' T Md. Code (1951), Art. 93, Secs. 129, et 8eq.
"Supra, n. 44.
"185 Md. 10, 43 A. 2d 32 (1945).
'032 Beavan 665, 55 Eng. Rep. 261 (1863), rev'd. 4 De G. J. & S. 129,
46 Eng. Rep. 865 (1863).
51 (1944) 2 All E. R. 255, (1944) A. C. 194.
5 Lindley, L. J., in Baker v. Stone, L. R. (1895), 2 Ch. 196, quoted with
approval by Judge Henderson in Judik v. Travers, 184 Md. 215, 222, 40 A.
2d 306 (1944). To the same effect, see opinions of Judge Pearce in Poultney
v. Tiffany, 112 Md. 630, 77 A. 117 (1910), -and Judge Bryan in Cox v.
Handy, 78 Md. 108, 27 A. 227, 501 (1893).
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(2) The rule of Ballenger v. McMillan applies only to
dispositions in favor of the settlor's or testator's own descendants.
"Lycett v. Thomas, supra, and the English cases
therein cited, belong to a narrow class of gifts to 'the
descendants of A and B per stirpes', i.e., independent
gifts to the descendants of any one of two or more persons, unconnected with previous gifts of income to the
same descendants or the specified ancestors. In such
cases, the question arises as to the intended point of

reference, ...

158

Subject only to these limitations, a" 'distribution among
my descendants then living per stirpes, would seem to
establish my children as the stocks and to fix the proportions in which my surviving grandchildren take'."5 4
5
Judge Henderson's opinion, in Patchell v. Groom, 8upra, n. 49, 31.
5' Judge Collins' opinion in Ballenger v. McMillan, supra, n. 44, 115, quoting Judge Henderson's opinion in Patchell v. Groom, ibid.

